Introduction
In 1943, the Supreme Court handed down West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette. With Justice Robert H. Jackson writing for the six-Justice majority, the Court upheld the First Amendment right of Jehovah's Witnesses schoolchildren to refuse to salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance, state-imposed obligations that the children and their parents contended were acts of idolatry that violated biblical commands. Judge Richard A. Posner has said that Justice Jackson's effort "may be the most eloquent majority opinion in the history of the Supreme Court." 2 Barnette reached the Court as the nation waged global war, a dire moment in history that Part II of this article describes. For its high drama and the endurance of its doctrine, the case continues to engage historians and students of the Court. 3 This article concerns the singular eloquence pinpointed by Judge Posner and others. 4 Justice Jackson adroitly balanced two ingredients-reason and passion-that (as Part III describes) have marked assessments of rhetoric and human experience since ancient times, that guided the nation's Founders and early Presidents, that have now moved President Obama in both of his memoirs, and that otherwise continue as dual touchstones frequently applied in law and popular culture. Few cases summon the high drama that energized the Court in Barnette during wartime, but (as Part IV describes) focusing on reason and passion throughout the opinionwriting process remains a useful judicial compass today. Justice Jackson's blend ofthese two ingredients, and his mastery of the written language, bequeathed a decision whose bedrock West Virginia State Board of Education's resolution requiring all public-school students and teachers to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance each day followed quickly after Pearl Harbor was attacked.
First Amendment holding, according to Professor Charles Alan Wright, "teems with vivid expressions and memorable statements" that still enrich the fabric of the law as statements of core American values. 5 
II. "Among the Darkest Times in
Recent Memory" Barnette' s record began in early January of 1942, barely a month after Japan attacked the Pacific naval fleet at Pearl Harbor. Historian David McCullough recalls these days as " [a] mong the darkest times in recent memory." 6 "Hitler's armies were nearly to Moscow; ... German submarines were sinking our oil tankers off the coasts of Florida and New Jersey, within sight of the beaches, and there was not a thing we could do about it; ... half our navy had been destroyed at Pearl
Harbor. We had scarcely any air force. Army recruits were drilling with wooden rifles. And there was no guarantee whatever that the Nazi war machine could be stopped." General James H. Doolittle's daring bombing raid over Tokyo and other Japanese cities would buoy American morale, but the raid was still a few months away (April 18). So too were the first great American victories, in the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4-8) and at Midway Island (June 4-7). Without the reassurance of hindsight available to later generations who know the war's outcome, Americans in mid-winter 1942 remained resolute and committed, yet aware that the nation faced an epic challenge to vanquish the Axis Powers in total war.
In the weeks following Pearl Harbor, appeals to patriotism summoning young and old spread quickly from coast to coast. On January 9, 1942, the West Virginia State Board of Education followed a number of other state and local school boards by passing a resolution that required all public school students and teachers to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance each day. 8 The West Virginia resolution allowed no exemptions because, the state board found, "national unity is the basis of national security."
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Noncompliance carried draconian punishment. Where West Virginia schoolchildren refused to salute or recite in their classrooms, their parents faced imprisonment for violating compulsory education acts and citation for child neglect, which might cause temporary or permanent loss of custody. "Few Supreme Court decisions," wrote one historian, "have ever provoked as violent a public reaction as the Gobitis opinion." The decision drew immediate condemnation from more than 170 leading newspapers and support from only a few, but the swift reaction extended beyond written words." The decision also unleashed a national wave of vigilantism against the Witnesses, whose refusal to salute or pledge allegiance to the flag appeared disloyal or even treasonous to Americans who perceived the salute and Pledge as domestic obligations with war clouds looming and who feared domestic subversion (the so-called Fifth Column). Witnesses families suffered beatings, physical intimidation, and property destruction from mobs, often while local sheriffs and other law enforcement officers stood watching in evident approval, without intervening to secure the victims' safety. 20 "Because lawless mobs may have misunderstood [Gobitis's] meaning is not in itself a reason to change it," wrote Justice Jackson's law clerk in an undated confidential memorandum. 21 Most historians acknowledge, however, that the intensity of the post-Gobitis brutality surprised and likely shocked Justices who had not anticipated such a bloody backlash against the small, peaceable religious group that had summoned their protection. 22 In the wake of Gobitis, as many as 2,000 Witnesses children were expelled from the nation's public schools, and many of their parents landed in criminal court. 23 On October the Supreme Court itself has thus impaired as an authority, we should deny protection to rights which we regard as among the most sacred of those protected by constitutional guaranties." 28 Gobitis dissenter Justice Stone and the two newest members of the Court, Justices Robert H. Jackson and Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., seemed poised to join the Opelika trio and overrule the earlier decision. Jackson's distaste for Gobitis was known within the Roosevelt administration while he was U.S. Attorney General before his appointment to the Court in 1941. 29 When Jackson wrote The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy a few months before he joined the Court, he cited Gobitis as inconsistent with the Court's usual "vigilan[ce] in stamping out attempts by local authorities to suppress the free dissemination of ideas, upon which the system of responsible democratic government rests." 30 On the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, a few months before Judge Parker wrote, Judge Rutledge dissented from a panel decision that upheld the convictions of two Jehovah's Witnesses for selling their religious literature on a public street without securing a license or paying a tax. 31 In an apparent ref- 
III. Reason and Passion in Historical Perspective
Barely a week after the announcement of Barnette, Time magazine, under the headline "Blot Removed," wrote that the Court had "reaffirmed its faith in the Bill of Rights-which, in 1940 [in Gobitis], it had come perilously close to outlawing." 35 Justice Jackson accomplished his mission with a majority opinion that balanced reason and passion, twin guideposts familiar to historians and observers of contemporary American political and popular culture.
As complementary and sometimes antagonistic forces for assessing performance or behavior, reason and passion hold an imposing pedigree that now reaches to the highest levels of our national life. In The Audacity of Hope, Barack Obama wrote that "the Constitution envisions a road map by which we marry passion to reason, the ideal of individual freedom to the demands of community." 36 In one of his earliest published speeches, delivered in 1838, twenty-eight-year-old Abraham Lincoln spoke out against a rash of lynchings for reflecting a "growing disposition to substitute the wild and furious passions, in lieu of the sober judgment of the Courts." 58 "Passion has helped us" by igniting the Revolution that won independence from Britain, the young Lincoln explained, but unrestrained passion "will in future be our enemy. Reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason, must furnish all the materials for our future support and defence." 59 Abolitionist leader and former slave Frederick Douglass wrote more generally about racial justice in 1855: "There is no relation more unfavorable to the development of honorable character, than that sustained by the slaveholder to the slave. Reason is imprisoned here, and passions run wild." 60 In our own time, voices in public-policy debates frequently urge resort to reason, not passion. 61 The tandem also figures in Presidential messages and, as it has since at least 1837, in House and Senate proceedings. 62 Reason and passion also sometimes constrain judicial action. A civil judgment may be overturned or reversed on appeal, for example, when counsel's appeal to juror bias produces a verdict that "reflects passion rather than reason."64 In cases charging capital crimes or other serious offenses, courts and commentators regularly summon jurors to return verdicts, judges to impose sentences, and citizens to retain attitudes that are grounded in reason, free from passion. 65 In a 2006 commencement address, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice told Boston College graduates about "five important responsibilities of educated people," including "the commitment to reason" and "the responsibility to find and follow your passion." 68 So too have contemporary philosophers, political theorists, government figures, theologians and biographers, sometimes in the titles of books whose discussion strives to balance the two. 69 Commentators frequently cite the influence of calibrated reason and passion on public affairs, fiction and nonfiction books, movies, plays, opera, music, and sports. 70 Speaking to the La 
IV. Reason and Passion in Judicial Opinion-Writing
Throughout our nation's history, much has been said about the extent to which judges can or should let personal feelings affect the decision making process. 72 The debate continues today as partisans frequently accuse opponents of nominating and confirming "judicial activists," judges who assertedly decide important cases based on their own personal predilections rather than by strictly applying precedents, statutes, and other relevant sources of law.
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This debate is not the issue here. This article concerns, not how judges reach decisions, but how vigorous, forceful writing can justify and explain decisions to the lawyers and parties; to future courts, lawyers, and litigants under our system of stare decisis; and sometimes also to lay readers in cases such as Barnette, which touch on matters of wider social concern. The Court had decided Barnette by internal debate and vote in conference before Justice Jackson ever put pen to paper.
Judges write opinions, not as private citizens, but as public officers vested by constitution and statute with authority to speak with the force of law. Formulas do not decide cases, but in constitutional and nonconstitutional decisionmaking alike, "reason" loosely means application of relevant legal doctrine to the facts, and "passion" loosely means vigorous, forceful opinion-writing that justifies and explains the decision's grounding in fact and law.
On a collegial appellate court, the appropriate balance of reason and passion depends in significant measure on whether the judge is writing a majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion. The majority opinion determines the parties' rights and obligations while creating precedents and rationales for future cases. Reason may rein in passion, because the writer seeking to maintain the majority knows that our system of precedent means that every paragraph, sentence, and clause-including every passage tinged with emotion-remains grist for later citation and potential application. A later court may find a particular passage to constitute holding, or else to constitute dictum warranting distinction or some measure of persuasive effect, but the passage's effect as a source of law derives from the court's constitutional and statutory authority to decide cases.
Writers of concurring and dissenting opinions may feel less constrained because their writings, by themselves, make no immediate law. If the writer so chooses, a concurrence, and particularly a dissent, can rely more on passion, freer from the need to maintain a coalition or to exercise circumspection in decision making. Dean Roscoe Pound said that on a court of last resort, a dissenting opinion "should express [the judge's] reason, not his feelings." 74 At one time or another, however, most of the recent Justices have seen the media call their dissents "passionate." 75 "A dissent in a court of last resort," wrote Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes is, "an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed." 76 The dissenter's appeal to posterity stands a better chance, however, with a disciplined dose of reason than with scarcely restrained passion. From one era to the next, Justices such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and John Marshall Harlan have held the title of a "Great Dissenter," but their influential dissents (like Justice Stone's Gobitis dissent) persuaded future Courts with reasoned legal blueprints delivered forcefully, and not with unadorned fist-pounding or shrill emotion. Barnette demonstrates that focused passion may also invigorate a majority opinion's reasoned analysis. From the outset, every participant in the flag-salute drama sensed the high stakes at issue. Few claims of right command greater respect than sincere invocations of religious liberty, and few justifications for government action command greater force than invocations of national security in wartime. As the Court fulfilled its constitutional responsibility to apply the First Amendment during the struggle against totalitarian regimes, Justice Jackson sought to instruct that Americans would tolerate personal conscience, even when reverence for the flag was at stake. Gobitis Ground #3: Because exemptions from mandatory in-school flag salutes raise disciplinary issues beyond the competence of federal judges, exemptions should be won at the ballot box and not in the courts.84 "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights," Justice Jackson responded with a firm passionate voice, "was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 85 "[W]e act in these matters," Justice Jackson continued, "not by authority of our competence but by force of our commissions. We cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function of this Court when liberty is infringed." 86 Gobitis Ground #4: The Constitution permits mandatory in-school flag salutes because "[tjhe ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment." 8 7 "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent," Justice Jackson wrote, "soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard." 88 "[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution," he explained, "with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization."
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order. 90 Justice Jackson closed his opinion with a reasoned, yet passionate endorsement of individual freedom that has been called "the most illuminating definition of Americanism in the history of the Court": "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." contributions of the clerk by way of research, organization and, to a lesser extent, method of approach, was often substantial. But the end product was unquestionably the Justice's own, both in form and in substance."
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Six weeks before Barnette, Justice Jackson had stressed the Court's responsibility to "do our utmost to make clear and easily understandable the reasons for deciding... cases as we do." 10 5 Barnette delivered on the promise with a clear exposition of reason and passion because Justice Jackson held a distinct personal advantage. "Good legal writing," says Professor Richard C. Wydick, "does not sound as though it had been written by a lawyer." 106 Justice Jackson left a legacy of eloquence because, as in Barnette, he indeed did not "write like a lawyer." Professor Fred Rodell even speculated that Justice Jackson "wrote so unlegally well-with the force of plain and pointed talk replacing lawyers' jargon-because he never went through law school nor won a law degree; indeed, ... he never even went through college, and one ungraduating year of law study ... was his only formal education after high school."
107 Justice Jackson was a largely self-taught writer, and he was both a skilled teacher and an avid learner. In 2003, Chief Justice Rehnquist was right that his mentor "was not simply an excellent legal writer, he was an excellent writer, period." (the Jehovah's Witnesses "have suffered brutal beatings; their property has been destroyed; they have been harassed at every turn by the resurrection and enforcement of little used ordinances and statutes"); Blasi and Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 443-45; Peters, supra note 3, at 237-38, 251 (discussing reaction on the Supreme Court); "The Flag Salute Cases" (Hall and Patrick), supra note 3, at 97; but see Tsai, supra note 3, at 374 ("The Justices might have been horrified at the ferocity of the reprisals, but they would have been unbelievably naive to think that their original decision did not expose recalcitrant students and their parents to a series of collateral legal and extralegal ramifications."). 23 Blasi and Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 445. 24 
